Music as a manifestation of life: exploring enactivism and the â€˜eastern perspectiveâ€™ for music education by Dylan van der Schyff
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 27 March 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00345
Edited by:
Adam M. Croom,
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Reviewed by:
Vasudevi Reddy,
University of Portsmouth, UK
Morten Carlsen,
Norwegian Academy of Music,
Norway
*Correspondence:
Dylan van der Schyff,
Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser
University, 8888 University Drive,
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6, Canada
dva5@sfu.ca
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Theoretical and Philosophical
Psychology, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 11 December 2014
Accepted: 11 March 2015
Published: 27 March 2015
Citation:
van der Schyff D (2015) Music as a
manifestation of life: exploring
enactivism and the ‘eastern
perspective’ for music education.
Front. Psychol. 6:345.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00345
Music as a manifestation of life:
exploring enactivism and the
‘eastern perspective’ for music
education
Dylan van der Schyff*
Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada
The enactive approach to cognition is developed in the context of music and music
education. I discuss how this embodied point of view affords a relational and bio-
cultural perspective on music that decentres the Western focus on language, symbol
and representation as the fundamental arbiters of meaning. I then explore how this
‘life-based’ approach to cognition and meaning-making offers a welcome alternative
to standard Western academic approaches to music education. More specifically,
I consider how the enactive perspective may aid in developing deeper ecological
understandings of the transformative, extended and interpenetrative nature of the
embodied musical mind; and thus help (re)connect students and teachers to the
lived experience of their own learning and teaching. Following this, I examine related
concepts associated with Buddhist psychology in order to develop possibilities for a
contemplative music pedagogy. To conclude, I consider how an enactive-contemplative
perspective may help students and teachers awaken to the possibilities of music
education as ‘ontological education.’ That is, through a deeper understanding of ‘music
as a manifestation of life’ rediscover their primordial nature as autopoietic and world-
making creatures and thus engage more deeply with musicality as a means of forming
richer and more compassionate relationships with their peers, their communities and
the ‘natural’ and cultural worlds they inhabit.
Keywords: enaction, embodied music cognition, holistic music education, Buddhist psychology, life philosophy,
music and language, music perception, music and culture
Introduction
In recent years there has been a growing interest among music psychologists and philosophers of
music and music education to explore the embodied and world-making aspects of humanmusical-
ity (DeNora, 2000; Bowman, 2004; Reybrouck, 2005; Krueger, 2009, 2011a,b; Elliott and Silverman,
2014). This has involved a critical decentering of Cartesian models of cognition, Enlightenment
esthetics, and related Western academic assumptions of what music and music education entail
(Small, 1998; Johnson, 2007). Indeed, it is increasingly recognized that aﬀective-conative and
synergistic activities such as musicking aﬀord pre-rational openings to empathic, embodied and
ethical ways of knowing and being when our ‘inner’ realities shape, and are shaped by, those of
others–thus highlighting the deep continuity between movement, feeling and the ‘extended’ or
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interpenetrative nature of cognition and ‘mind’ (Mathews, 2008;
see also Clark and Chalmers, 1998; Nakagawa, 2000; Menary,
2010; Colombetti, 2014).
This renewed interest in the deep relevance of musicality for
human development and well-being is revealing music as a ‘focal
practice’ that supports a total ‘ontological’ education (Thomson,
2001; Dreyfus, 2004). This means that a music educator dedicated
to developing a wide range of interdisciplinary knowledge in a
critically reﬂective, praxis-based context may accomplish much
more than getting students to develop technical ﬂuency or to
listen and perform according to pre-given standards and conven-
tions (Elliott and Silverman, 2014). She may help students to see
music not merely as a thing to be reproduced or consumed, as a
product or a ‘pleasure technology’ (Pinker, 2009), but rather as
an opening to the world and with it a range of scientiﬁc, philo-
sophical, ecological, ethical, socio-cultural and ‘self ’ knowledge
not traditionally associated with music education in the West.
Along these lines, an ontological music education may also play
an important role in developing much needed forms of global
ecological and ‘holistic’ thinking that look beyond the reductive,
reifying, instrumental, and commodifying tendencies often asso-
ciated with the Western perspective (Bai, 2001; Kincheloe, 2003,
2008; Giroux, 2011).
With this in mind I discuss here the relevance of what
Nakagawa (2000) refers to as the ‘Eastern perspective’1 for
(music) education. Despite the geographical denotation, this view
is not limited to Asian philosophy and psychology. Rather it
encompasses a range of thinkers, Eastern and Western, who
in various ways understand mind and consciousness as funda-
mentally embodied and ecological phenomena; and who discuss
ontological issues in the context of contingency, transforma-
tion and the interpenetration of dynamic systems. Over the
past decades this perspective has become associated with the
interdisciplinary research program known as enactivism,2 which
draws on Buddhist psychology as well as thinkers associated with
Western cognitive science, phenomenology, and existential phi-
losophy (Varela et al., 1993; Thompson, 2007). As I go, I develop
this general perspective in the context of a life-based philoso-
phy of music education in order to decentre the Western focus
on objectivist or third person didactic approaches. To conclude,
I consider possibilities of a contemplative-enactive music peda-
gogy for (re)connecting students and educators with their lived,
embodied realities (Bai, 2003).
The Biological Origins of Mind and Meaning
Generally speaking, the ‘Eastern perspective’ may be under-
stood in the context of a holistic ‘life philosophy’ (Miller, 1997;
Nakagawa, 2000). As its name suggests, life philosophy embraces
an ‘animate’ ontology (Bai, 2013) and thus a pedagogical prac-
tice based in such an approach “conceives of education as an
integral part of the greater Life processes; that is, education is
a manifestation of Life and at the same time a vehicle in the
1Other thinkers have coined similar phases with the goal of developing a ‘global’
holistic philosophy of life that incorporates the best of Eastern and Western per-
spectives, as well as indigenous knowledge from around the world (see Nakagawa,
2000).
2For a review of enactive music cognition see Matyja and Schiavio, 2013.
service of reconnecting human life with the fundamental life”
(Nakagawa, 2000, p. 79). Thismeans that an ‘Eastern’ approach to
music education requires a radical opening up to the fundamen-
tal organic processes that aﬀord communication and meaning-
making beginning at the most primordial levels of embodied
being-in-the-world.
In order to better understand what this entails we may begin
by considering the work of a range of ecological and life-minded
thinkers who understand cognition and ‘mind’ as a relational or
‘enactive’ process (Bateson, 1972; Varela et al., 1993; Thompson,
2007; Stewart et al., 2010). This perspective understands cre-
ative, living cognition not as a distinct disembodied category or
in terms of dualistic-mechanistic Cartesian metaphors (e.g., the
mind as computer). Instead, it sees mind as a relational pro-
cess that is ontologically continuous with basic processes of life
itself3. Here communication and meaning-making are explored
in terms of the deep relationship between action and perception–
where a meaningful world is ‘brought forth’ or ‘enacted’ from a
background of understanding that develops through an ongoing
history of structural coupling between organism and environ-
ment (Varela et al., 1993; O’Regan and Nöe, 2001; Nöe, 2006).
Biologist Richard Lewontin explains,
Just as there is no organism without an environment, so there is
no environment without an organism. The organism and environ-
ment are not actually separately determined. The environment is
not a structure imposed on living beings from outside but is in fact
a creation of those beings. The environment is not an autonomous
process but a reﬂection of the biology of the species. (Lewontin,
1983, p. 99)
And therefore,
[...] there is always a ‘next step’ for the system in its perceptually
guided action [. . .] the actions of the system are always directed
toward situations that have yet to become actual. Thus cogni-
tion as embodied action both poses the problems and speciﬁes
those paths that must be tread or laid down for their solution.
(Lewontin, 1983; also quoted in Varela et al., 1993, p. 205)
Put simply, this conception of cognition allows us to consider
organism and environment not as a pre-given duality, but rather
as dependently co-arising through the activity of the organism as
it brings forth a world. By this light, living cognition is necessarily
contextually adaptive and creative–like a “path that exists only as
it is laid down in walking” (Varela et al., 1993, p. 205). Thus while
the enactive approach asserts the inseparability of the organism
and environment, it also highlights the organism’s autonomy–
or its ability to enact a world in ways that are not completely
driven from the side of the environment. This means that the
organism-environment relationship is necessarily asymmetrical;
that living cognition is based, ﬁrst and foremost, in the aﬀectively
motivated (valenced) sensory-motor activity of organic systems
3This view has an antecedent in Dewey’s (1938/1991, p. 26) principle of continuity
where “rational operations grow out of organic activities without being identical
with that from which they emerge.”
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that exhibit ‘operational closure’ (Varela, 1979; Di Paolo, 2005,
2009; Thompson, 2007; Colombetti, 2014).
In order to better understand what this entails, one might con-
sider how the input–output functions of a computer depend on
externally imposed designs (hardware and software), informa-
tion processing rules (system language), and interpretations of
outputs; it is not self-making and thus cannot function mean-
ingfully in an autonomous fashion; its operations are dependent
on, and must remain open to, the external (human) forces that
impose meaning, functionality and form. In living systems, how-
ever, the meaning of this or that interaction is “not prescribed
from outside but is the result of the organization and history
of the system itself ” (Varela et al., 1993, p. 157). Here it is
important to recognize that while the meaningful world enacted
by the organism-environment couplings of living systems are
‘operationally closed’ (intrinsically meaningful), the relationship
between organism and environment must remain dynamically
open so that the ‘information’ developed by the systemmaintains
its contextual relevance (Bateson, 1972). As Thompson puts it,
[. . .] information, dynamically conceived, is the making of a
diﬀerence that makes a diﬀerence for some-body somewhere.
Information here is understood in the sense of informare, to form
within. An autonomous system becomes informed by virtue of
the meaning formation in which it participates, and this meaning
formation depends on the way its endogenous dynamics speciﬁes
things that make a diﬀerence to it. (Thompson, 2007, p. 57)
By this light, information does not ﬁrst consist of abstract sym-
bols, nor is it simply ‘out there’ to be anonymously processed.
Rather it is ontogenic–it grows from the relevant relationships
and valences (‘primordial dynamism’; Thompson, 2007) that
emerge as a dynamic organism-environment system constitutes a
life-world (Oyama, 2000). Thus cognition and meaning-making
are not ﬁrst understood as rule-based ‘problem solving’ on the
basis of optimizing correspondence with a pre-given world, but
rather as an ongoing creative process through which a viable or
‘suﬃcing’ world is brought forth (Varela et al., 1993; Di Paolo
et al., 2010; see also Merleau-Ponty, 2002; Heidegger, 2008).
Put simply, this mode of meaning-making goes deeper than
fact-based knowledge, technical knowledge or knowing ‘this or
that.’ Rather, it is based in the adaptive and embodied learn-
ing processes that enable, “knowing how to negotiate our way
through a world that is not ﬁxed and pre-given but that is contin-
ually shaped by the types of actions in which we engage” (Varela
et al., 1993, p. 144). Thus, given the variety of transforming
environments in which human beings and other organisms live
and interact, the enactive approach embraces the consistencies of
experience, but also, crucially, the diﬀerences. As Bateson (1972,
1979/1980) points out, it is this ability to perceive and communi-
cate the “news of diﬀerence” that binds the living world together4.
And indeed, it is just this conative, aﬀective, and communal
reaching out to (and mutual transformation through) diﬀerence
4Critical pedagogue Kincheloe (2003) echoes this insight when he writes, “In both
its corporeal and cognitive expressions the autopoietic life process reaches out for
diﬀerence, for novelty, to embrace its next ontological level.”
that characterizes the asymmetry of the dynamic organism-
environment relationship I began to discuss above–whereby a
basic metabolic perspective of value, a point of view, or indeed, a
‘self ’ may arise, develop and ﬂourish (Jonas, 1966; Di Paolo, 2005;
Thompson, 2007; Barbaras, 2010)5.
As Maturana and Varela (1980, 1992) demonstrate, such
autopoietic (self-making) histories of dynamic organism-
environment couplings may be observed in even the simplest
single celled organisms. While such creatures clearly do not
possess the neural complexity to support abstract represen-
tations, they nevertheless move purposefully, communicate,
develop viable relationships, and thus maintain a life-world
in the transforming environments they inhabit. Although it
would certainly be premature to understand such creatures
as conscious, these basic forms of life nevertheless exhibit the
origins of cognition and mind as valenced, aﬀective, perceptually
guided action (Thompson, 2007; Colombetti, 2014).
Here we may also consider how such simple autopoietic
organisms may reach out to each other and thus function col-
lectively as interpenetrative dynamic environments–resulting in
more complex systems such as multi-celled organisms; nervous,
respiratory, and immune systems; brains; social organizations;
and the emergence of ‘reason,’ language, culture, and conscious-
ness (Varela et al., 1993; Oyama, 2000; see also Johnson, 2007;
Froese and Di Paolo, 2011). It follows, then, that for highly com-
plex organisms such as human beings autopoiesis entails a lived
developmental history including social or bio-cultural embodi-
ment within a domain of “consensual action and cultural history”
(Varela et al., 1993, p. 149; see also Hutchins, 2010; Cuﬀari et al.,
2014)6. With this in mind, we may begin to consider musicality
as a manifestation of such inter(en)active life processes. That is,
as a fundamental participatory (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007)
sense-making capacity of human beings; one of the principal ways
we reach out to, and orient ourselves relationally in the world
as dynamic, self-making creatures who span physical, biological,
emotional, cultural, and rational modes of being.
From Reification to Music-in-(en)action
The enactive perspective has profound implications for how we
might begin to (re)conceive of music and music education as
5However, once such asymmetry (i.e., the permeable boundary and metabolic
processes that occur inside it) can no longer be supported the organism-
environment relationship, like any other complex dynamic system, dissolves into
non-diﬀerentiation. This may come about through a disruption in the ability of the
organism-environment coupling to engage in the dynamic, adaptive behavior nec-
essary to maintain a viable life-world, which ﬁnally leads to sickness and death. As
Di Paolo and Thompson (2014, p. 73) write, “Basic cognition, on this view, is not a
matter of representing states of aﬀairs but rather of establishing relevance through
the need to maintain an identity that is constantly facing the possibility of disin-
tegration. From this perspective, the body is not just the means but also an end of
being a cognitive system. To put the point another way, basic cognition is more a
matter of adaptive self-regulation in precarious conditions than abstract problem
solving.”
6As Johnson writes, “meaning includes patterns of embodied experience and pre-
conceptual structures of our sensibility (i.e., our mode of perception, or orienting
ourselves and of interacting with other objects, events, or persons). These embod-
ied patterns do not remain private or peculiar to the person who experiences them.
Our community helps us interpret and codify many of our felt patterns. They
become shared cultural modes of experience and help to determine the nature of
our meaningful, coherent understanding of our ‘world”’ (Johnson, 1987, p. 14).
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a manifestation of life. As I have considered, this is an onto-
logically continuous and radically non-reductive approach to
cognition that embraces complexity, diﬀerence, and the feeling-
emotional body. It highlights the dynamic, creative, and interpen-
etrative nature of living meaning-making as it develops through
direct embodied experience (Cuﬀari et al., 2014). As such, enac-
tivism oﬀers a radical shift in perspective from the disembodied,
depersonalized, and rather prescriptive conceptions of cognition,
knowledge and esthetics we in the West have inherited from
Enlightenment thinking (Johnson, 2007). Indeed, it asks us to
consider how many of our common epistemological and onto-
logical assumptions may in fact be based in sedimented modes
of (dualist) thinking and perceiving that associate ‘meaning’ and
cognition solely with language and abstract representation. As I
will discuss, such assumptions are problematic when they lead
to reductive and reiﬁed ways of knowing the world, which often
come to prescribe not only how we talk and think about esthetics
and science, but also how we think about emotion, nature, or any
number of dynamic and transformative phenomena and states of
being that we attempt to pin-down with words and categories like
love, anger, happiness; or, indeed, education, mind and self (Bai,
2001, 2003).
Reiﬁcation is seeing the world through conceptual categories
which, if not carefully seen through, gives the seer the illusion
that reality inherently comes in these categories. Categories are,
by nature, discontinuous, dichotomous, linear, and most often,
dualistic. Hence in seeing reality through categories, we risk the
ability to see the intrinsic connectedness behind all phenomena
and phenomenal beings (an ability that ecological consciousness
demands). In particular, we risk the ability to see the co-arising of
the perceiver and the perceived, the subject and the object (Bai,
2003, p. 8).
Reiﬁed notions of music emerge from and reinforce engrained
cultural ideologies–such as those surrounding Western classical
music’s putative autonomy and superiority, where its universal
relevance, meaning and legitimacy is thought to be independent
of those who experience and perform it (Small, 1998; Bohlman,
1999; Clarke, 2012). This perspective imposes a reductive, linear,
and depersonalized conception of musical communication: there
is a musical object that possesses certain objective formal and/or
emotional qualities, a performer who interprets and transmits
them, and an anonymous subject who perceives them; ‘a view
from nowhere and nobody’ (Nagel, 1989; Dibben, 2012). This
view places whatever music expresses ‘in the music’ a priori; it
assumes music to be an objective ‘thing’ rather than an interac-
tive, relational, multi-modal activity; and it creates a rather ﬁxed
boundary between some notion of what the music is on one hand,
and the environments in which it is created and experienced on
the other. This conception is especially prevalent inWestern aca-
demic music education, where the focus remains on producing
faithful reproductions of ‘works’ (Elliott and Silverman, 2014); as
well as on prescriptive, codiﬁed, and hierarchical approaches to
analysis and ensemble performance.
Put simply, this perspective has tended to promote an anony-
mous status for the musical participant; it ignores the neces-
sity of personal agency and embodiment for esthetic experience
(Benson, 2001; Bowman, 2004; Dewey, 2005; Johnson, 2007); and
it downplays the importance of praxis and personal histories for
the development of musical meanings7. As such it is clearly at
odds with the enactive approach to cognition when it ignores
the interactive, adaptive, and transformative possibilities of the
musical organism. And indeed, from this reifying and decontex-
tualized perspective it is not diﬃcult to see why music is often
understood to be biologically meaningless–a cultural product or
pleasure technology (Pinker, 2009) that plays with our emotional
faculties in ways that are not personally relevant (Koelsch, 2013;
c.f. Krueger, 2013; Scherer and Coutinho, 2013). Lines (2005)
sums up the inﬂuence of this perspective on music education well
and is worth quoting at length,
The nihilistic state or condition that maintains a ‘valueless’ music
(music disconnected from our changing life events) is, however,
present in the day to day business of music education. Musical
nihilism [. . .] perpetuate[s] a culture of musical impotence, where
only a few survive the diﬃcult and detached ride to musical ‘per-
fection.’ In addition to the aﬀects of such culturally selective tradi-
tions, musical nihilism is more generally found in the limited role
music plays in the lives of busy urban-dwelling people. To many,
the musical sphere is now an area that is forgotten, unused, and
neglected. Education in music has come to be seen and regarded
by many as an inactive sphere. The conceptual frames–the ways
of thinking that support musical inactivity–revolve around sev-
eral other (not unrelated) key discourses including the cult of the
elite musician, music as a commodity-end and the widespread
neglect of non-verbal or non-written communication in educa-
tion. (Lines, 2005)
This orientation has received a good deal of criticism in
recent decades, most notably perhaps from music educator,
Small (1998), and sociologist, DeNora (2000). DeNora (2000)
sees musical meaning as a process that plays out in the evolv-
ing ecological, socio-cultural and bio-cognitive contexts of lived
experience–music as action, as a therapeutic “force for bio-
cognitive organization,” and as part of an esthetic environment
through which cultural and individual identities may be con-
structed and deconstructed (e.g., see Willis, 1978). Small (1998)
argues that music is best understood as a verb rather than a
noun; his theory of musicking considers human musicality as a
multi-faceted, relational activity8. This view resonates with the
fact that most musical activity around the world is dynami-
cally enmeshed with the activities of life–with work, play, social
7This point of view also shows itself in the broader consumer culture where musi-
cal conventions, the score (in both the physical and the abstract sense) and, more
recently, the recorded product, become what is signiﬁed by the word ‘music.’ Along
these lines, a number of critical theorists have pointed out how this attitude is in
line with the continuing process of reiﬁcation associated with the development of
mechanical reproduction and commodity fetishism in Western capitalist society
(Lukács, 1971; Adorno, 1973; Adorno and Horkheimer, 2002; Benjamin, 2008).
8Small (1998, p. 9) writes, “The fundamental nature and meaning of music lies not
in objects, not in musical works at all, but in action, in what people say and do.
[. . .] To music is to take part, in any capacity in a musical performance, whether
by performing, by listening, by rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for
the performance (what is called composing), or by dancing.”
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life, religion, ritual, politics, healing and so on (Blacking, 1976,
1995). In such contexts, music often begins very early in life
and is associated with, and often inextricable from, other modes
of expressive behavior like dance and storytelling (Green, 2012;
Shehan-Campbell and Wiggins, 2013). Here, music retains its
status as a transformative communal experience-activity and is
meaningful in terms of its relationship to the events and contexts
in which it functions (Green, 2012).
Along these lines, a much deeper and more complex con-
ception of what musicality means is emerging in Western
scholarship–one that embraces its deep bio-social, ecological and
transformative signiﬁcance for human wellbeing beginning at
evolutionary and ontogenetic levels (Cross, 2001, 2010, 2012;
Mithen, 2005; van der Schyﬀ, 2013a,b; Croom, 2014). Such
research explores how, beginning in infancy, meaningful musi-
cal experiences emerge from and support our innate proclivity to
seek out and enact meaningful worlds through adaptive embod-
ied kinesthetic interactions with the physical and social-cultural
environments (Johnson, 2007; Barbaras, 2010; Gapenne, 2010;
Sheets-Johnstone, 2010; Krueger, 2013). For example, musical-
ity is increasingly understood as a form of ‘joint sense-making’
between infant and caregiver, where it is thought to play a major
role in the development of empathy and other forms of social
cognition (e.g., ‘participatory’ sense-making; De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007). For many researchers, this demonstrates the pri-
mordial necessity of musicality for embodied and pre-linguistic
emotional forms of understanding and communication (Trehub
and Nakata, 2001; Parncutt, 2009)–including what Trevarthen
(2002) terms the “primary intersubjectivity” that is so necessary
for developing social bonds. Such insights resonate closely with
the enactive approach to development and cognition; they draw
standard dualistic, idealist and objectivist assumptions about the
nature and meaning of musical experience in to question; and
they place a greater emphasis on understanding how people
become involved with music in terms of enacting individual and
socio-cultural economies (Green, 2001, 2008)–not as passive lis-
teners, reproducers or ‘consumers’ but rather as autonomous,
active and collaborative participants in the construction of mean-
ing (O’Neill and Green, 2004; Reybrouck, 2005; De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2007).
Reconciling the ‘Double Articulation’
The enactive perspective also allows us to decentre the Western
focus on language, symbol and representation as the fundamen-
tal arbiters of communication and meaning. Indeed, because
language and music are both auditory modes of communication–
and because the great works of Western Classical music appear
(post facto) to be constructed largely according to the ‘generative’
or ‘grammatical’ rules of tonal harmony (Lerdahl and Jackendoﬀ,
1996)–a major focus has been placed on the relationship between
music and language as cognitive systems (Patel, 2008; Rebuschat
et al., 2012)9. This dominant language-centered conception of
cognition and meaning has even lead some philosophers to
9Along these lines, some psychologists argue that human musicality is biologically
meaningless; that it is dependent, or ‘parasitic’ on, cognitive information process-
ing mechanisms that evolved to support language (e.g., syntax, auditory scene
analysis and so on; Sperber, 1996; Pinker, 2009; c.f. van der Schyﬀ, 2013a).
assume that wordless music, as an ‘object’ of perception, can-
not properly be understood as meaningful because it contains
no semantic content (Kivy, 1990, 2002). Nevertheless, by this
view the locus of musical expressivity is still understood to be
found in the ‘thing,’ the work itself ’ (Small, 1998; Bohlman, 1999;
Clarke, 2012); and the esthetic forms of cognition associated with
music are often thought to be the product of detached rationalis-
tic (i.e., Kantian) appraisal processes (cf. Johnson, 2007; Scherer
and Coutinho, 2013). In brief, such assumptions demonstrate the
degree to which seemingly disembodied forms of propositional,
conceptual or ‘correspondence-based’ meaning-making associ-
ated with language, symbol and representation have become
privileged in the modern Western psyche10–thus reinforcing the
reiﬁed and depersonalized approaches to music I began to cri-
tique in the last section.
A useful analysis of this orientation is oﬀered by Eastern
thinkers, such as Maruyama (see Nakagawa, 2000), who describe
contemporary human existence in terms of a problematic ‘double
articulation.’11 Here the ‘primary articulation’ may be under-
stood in terms of the fundamental autopoietic life processes I
discussed above. That is, the dynamic ‘functional circle’ by which
an organism enacts a bio-cognitive milieu (Umwelt) by means
of its receptor and eﬀector systems (von Uexküll, 1973; see also
Varela et al., 1993; Reybrouck, 2001, 2005). This biological world
is, of course, as real for humans as it is for any other life form.
However, humans may also be understood to inhabit a ‘symbolic
world’ (the ‘secondary articulation’) that “articulates reality in
accordance with its own categories” and that over time comes to
be seemingly “independent of biological dispositions. In this way,
human beings dwell in apparently “double biological and sym-
bolic worlds” (Nakagawa, 2000, p. 38)12. This means that although
the biological-somatic articulation is primordial, it nevertheless
becomes overshadowed by the dominance of the secondary or
linguistic-symbolic articulation–i.e., while “the ‘secondary artic-
ulation’ is genetically second” it comes to be “factually and exis-
tentially ‘primary”’ in human consciousness (Nakagawa, 2000).
Because of this the world often presents itself to us as a collection
of seemingly ﬁxed (i.e., reiﬁed) independent categories and objec-
tive things, pre-given social structures and institutionalized ways
of thinking and interacting (Bai, 2013).
According to Johnson (2007), this is exacerbated by the fact
that in non-reﬂective day-to-day life, the body (our ‘biologi-
cal selves’) tends to “hide out.” That is, how the body tends
to retreat to the background as our intentionality is directed
‘out into the world’–while nevertheless tacitly providing the very
means and context by which all our perceptions and engage-
ments take place (see also Polyani, 1969; Gallagher, 2005). Such
10As Johnson (2007, p. 216) writes, “On one side of the dualistic gap we have
concepts, thought, reason and knowledge. On the other side we have sensations,
feelings, emotions, and imagination. What has been so fateful about this dualism
for contemporary philosophy is the way it aligns meaning with the cognitive and
thus dismisses quality, feeling, and emotion from any account of meaning.”
11A similar insight is shared by Cassirer (1944): “Man has, as it were, discovered a
new method of adapting himself to his environment. Between the receptor system
and the eﬀector system. . . we ﬁnd in man a third link which we may describe as
the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life.
12Enactivists make similar distinctions between ‘ﬁrst’ and ‘second’ order sense-
making (Froese, 2012).
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insights have prompted a range of interdisciplinary research that
is developing a much more nuanced and embodied view of what
communication and meaning-making (musical or otherwise)
entails (Searle, 1967; Streek, 1980; Runeson and Frykholm, 1983;
Davidson, 2005, 2012; Johnson, 2007; DeNora, 2011). Above all,
this work highlights the fact that meaning is not communicated
solely through linguistic abstractions, and that action, feeling and
lived embodied histories involving participatory forms of sense-
making are central to the construction of meaning in creative
living communication (Sheets-Johnstone, 1999, 2010; De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007; Jensen and Cuﬀari, 2014).
In line with this, one of the goals of the enactive program is
to heal the ontological-epistemological gap of the ‘double artic-
ulation’ by demonstrating how so-called ‘higher order’ cognitive
capacities (e.g., language) may be explained in a continuous fash-
ion through processes such as coupling, autopoiesis, movement
and embodied action-as-perception (Stewart, 2010; Froese, 2012).
Neurological support for this project comes from the discovery
of so-called mirror neurons, which appear to activate both in
the brains of those performing actions and in those of onlook-
ers (Gallese and Goldman, 1998; Rizzolatti et al., 2002; see also
Tomasello, 1999, 2008). This reinforces the idea of a primordial
‘corporeal intentionality’ where cognition originates in interac-
tive adaptive behavior that involves aﬀectively motivated move-
ment, corporeal articulations, and embodied-empathic states of
being (for a brief overview see Thompson, 2007, p. 393–395).
Moreover, this research also suggests that while cognition may
emerge ﬁrst through ‘manifest motor activity’ (i.e., actual phys-
ical movement and expressions; perceptually guided action),
embodied-aﬀective experiences also inform our thinking in ‘cov-
ered’ ways13. As Johnson (2007, p. 12) explains, “The core idea
is that our experience of meaning is based, ﬁrst, on sensorimo-
tor experience, our feelings, and our visceral connections to the
world; and, second, on various imaginative capacities for using
sensorimotor processes to understand abstract concepts” . Thus
even in physically inactive and reﬂective states, our multi-sensory
and aﬀectively motivated embodied existence appears to ground
how we attribute valences, goals, and intentionality within the
social-esthetic environments we inhabit; it underpins our abil-
ity to engage in the ongoing process of enacting the meaningful
relationships with the people, activities, ideas and things that
constitute the complex fabric of our lives as social animals.
Embodiment, Musical Sense-Making and
the ‘Metaphorical’ Mind
Recent studies suggest that mirror-neurons may be spread
throughout the brain, implying that they function inter-modally
(Leman, 2008; Ramachandran, 2011). This may be considered in
the context of further observations, which show that brain areas
13For example, Molnar-Szakacs and Overy (2006;Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2011) have
developed an action based perspective on musical communication they refer to
as the shared aﬀective motion experience model (SAME). Put very simply, this
model oﬀers a way of understanding how the proposed mirror neuron system
in humans allows music to access emotional faculties: depending on the listener,
movement is ‘extracted’ at diﬀerent levels of the motor system; and emotional
intentions are thought to be inferred directly from this motor-activity, whether
actual or simulated.
usually associated with speciﬁc bio-cognitive functions may actu-
ally engage in cross activation (extreme instances of which result
in experiences of synaesthesia; see Ramachandran, 2011)14. This
has led a number of researchers (e.g., Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 2003;
Johnson, 2007; Ramachandran, 2011) to describe the way we
develop understandings of the world in terms of ‘metaphorical’
processes–a notion that goes deeper than the common linguistic-
conceptual usage of the term in order to describe the embodied-
ecological and often pre-reﬂective (non-linguistic) processes that
allow us to enact meaningful esthetic experiences through the
development of cross-modal relations (Eitan and Granot, 2006;
Eitan and Timmers, 2010; see also Croom, 2012). Such insights
are further supported by a range of research in neuroscience that
has demonstrated how cognitive-esthetic potentials depend on
the basic bodily systems that allow us to maintain a state of well-
being and that constitute the most fundamental ways we become
aware of and involved with the world–i.e., metabolism, basic
reﬂexes, the immune system, pain and pleasure responses, basic
drives, emotions, and feelings (Di Paolo, 2005; Thompson, 2007;
Barbaras, 2010; see also Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003; LeDoux,
2002). Meaning-making is thus increasingly understood to be
based in such complex interactive soma-sensory processes where
body and brain, world and mind, form an integrated evolv-
ing system. That music deeply aﬀects such processes has been
well documented in clinical literature and is, of course, evident
in everyday experience (Bunt, 1994; DeNora, 2000; Berger and
Turow, 2011; van der Schyﬀ, 2013b; Croom, 2014).
All of this highlights the apparent autonomy of our sen-
sory and metabolic systems while at the same time embracing
how they develop co-dependently–that is, how experience and
meaning arises relationally (this resonates with the Buddhist con-
ception of the aggregate mind I will discuss shortly). As Johnson
(2007) points out, this upsets the rationalizing Enlightenment
view that associates esthetics and meaning solely with ‘detached’
forms of ‘higher’ representational or appraisal-based cognition.
Rather, from the enactive perspective, our esthetic capacities
emerge early in life as the primary way we engage meaning-
fully with the world. Here, Johnson (2007) draws on Stern’s
(1985) notion of ‘vitality aﬀect contours’–a concept that employs
embodied-kinetic terms (surging, ﬂeeting, fading away, and so
on) to describe how as infants we strive to create a secure, coher-
ent and meaningful existence through primordial cross-modal
esthetic processes (see also van der Schyﬀ, 2013b). Such pro-
cesses, Johnson (2007) suggests, are based on the developmental
coupling of the organism and the environment through action;
they allow us to recognize and create ‘metaphorical’ relationships
between cross-modal perceptions, aﬀective-emotional responses
and feelings as we reach out to the world and thus develop and
move (and are moved) through time and space. As such, he
argues that this primordial embodied-esthetic capacity is the ori-
gin of meaning-making and ‘mind’ itself, and therefore grounds
14This process does not involve the neat sharing of resources via the inputs and
outputs of ’cognitivist’ computational modules, but rather a more plastic pro-
cess whereby neural ‘webs’ develop in complex interpenetrating ways that allow
for deep and sometimes highly ideographic relationships to form between seem-
ingly disparate areas of experience (e.g., color and number, sound and texture; see
Ramachandran (2011).
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all rational thinking and ‘higher’ cognition. Importantly, Johnson
(2007) claims that these primordial esthetic ways of meaning-
making continue to shape the contours of our experience–and
how we meaningfully orient ourselves in the world—even as we
grow-up and engage in more abstract, symbolic, categorical or
propositional ways of thinking (see also Sheets-Johnstone, 2010;
and Nunes, 2010).
In brief, Johnson (2007) argues that traditional ‘cognitivist’
assumptions have led to distorted and reduced understandings
of both linguistic and musical communication; and he calls for
an approach that allows us to discuss music ﬁrst in terms of the
actual experiences it aﬀords. These, he argues, are grounded in
the basic logics of space, time and movement that, via the cross-
modal, metaphorical and embodied nature of human cognition,
give rise to the fundamental ways we get involved with music
within the physical, social, and cultural ecologies we inhabit.
Thus, as Johnson (2007) suggests, we would do better to describe
musical experience ﬁrst in embodied-ecological terms such as
‘moving music,’ ‘moving times,’ ‘musical landscape,’ and ‘music
as moving force’; or image schemas that describe paths of motion
(e.g., source-path-goal; Johnson, 1987; Lakoﬀ and Johnson, 2003;
see also Croom, 2012).
From an enactive perspective, then, music is not, ﬁrst and
foremost, an ‘object’ of experience–a ‘thing’ or ‘work’ whose
signiﬁcance is necessarily pre-determined. Nor are musical expe-
riences best understood as fundamentally representational, rule-
based or abstract-symbolic phenomena. Rather, they are ﬁrst
sensed as patterns of feeling, emotion and movement; they are
experienced directly; and their meanings are enacted in vari-
ous ways, both shared and personal, by the people, communities
and cultures involved (Johnson, 1987; Dewey, 2005). Thus, as
Thompson (2007, p. 326) writes, music “has a subjective char-
acter that makes it immediately manifest, without observation
or inference, as one’s own experience. In this way we experi-
ence our listening implicitly, without it becoming an object of
awareness.” This insight articulates the need to move beyond the
dualistic and objectivist assumptions implicit in many current
approaches and embrace a developmental and phenomenological
perspective–one that looks beyond mind-world, subject-object
dichotomies to explore how the complex, transforming, living,
ﬁrst-person experience of music emerges from its ecologically sit-
uated and (inter)subjective nature, and not ﬁrst from some kind
of “object consciousness” (Thompson, 2007, p. 326). Indeed, from
this perspective wemay better understand howmusicking aﬀords
the possibility of (re)engaging with the world directly–from the
perspective of the somatic-biological ‘primary articulation’ of
fundamental life–and thus help to reveal human cognition as
an ontologically continuous bio-cultural continuum, whereby
meanings developed at the level of symbolic or ‘secondary artic-
ulation’ no longer retain a ﬁxed or decontextualized status, but
may be seen as continuous with primary forms.
There are numerous musical examples that demonstrate how
this is so. However, for the sake of brevity, I ask the reader to
consider only one of them–namely, Jimi Hendrix’s ground break-
ing performance of the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ at Woodstock (see
also Clarke, 2005; DeNora, 2011). This performance radically
reframes a cultural icon by placing it in the context of a sonic
enactment that expresses the brutality of the Vietnam war and
the hypocrisy of the hegemonic American foreign policy that sup-
ported it. Here Hendrix creates a violent (and ironic) soundscape
where the symbol of patriotism incarnate in the Anthem is decon-
structed through its interpenetration with chaotic noise–out of
which arise sonic episodes that evoke gunﬁre, falling bombs,
and human screaming. What is so remarkable about this perfor-
mance is not only how Hendrix enacts new understandings of
what musical performance and guitar playing entail, but also how
his return to the primal cross-modal (‘metaphorical’) origins of
music in sound, aﬀectivity, movement, space and empathy allows
the evocative ‘musical’ episodes to be experienced as more than
simply symbolic. Rather they may be witnessed as transformative
phenomena that are lived through (Thompson, 2007)–visceral
evocations for critical, emotional, and compassionate imagining
that emerge from and simultaneously ‘inform’ and transform the
interpenetrative system of performer, listener and the (dissent-
ing) socio-cultural ecology being enacted. Indeed, this wonderful
example goes well beyond musical ‘communication as correspon-
dence’ and reveals the meaning of music as a deeply communal
activity (Krishnamurti, 1970). It also suggests possibilities for new
forms of multi-modal (e.g., Kress, 2010) and critically embod-
ied musical analysis (e.g., phenomenological-contemplative) that
may have profound pedagogical implications.
Cosmic Thinking and the Expanding Musical
Mind
The enactive position I have outlined above sees musicality as
deeply continuous with the primordial embodied-esthetic forms
of sense-making that aﬀord a ﬂourishing autopoietic existence. As
I have argued, musical experiences entail direct kinds of involve-
ment and understandings that are not always categorical, ﬁxed,
or ‘self ’ focussed; musical ‘information’ and knowledge is dis-
tributed between embodied minds and environments (Sutton,
2006), and emerges via the interpenetration of manifold biologi-
cal, social, and cultural processes. Thus our musicality aﬀords the
possibility of engaging in embodied-ecological forms of knowing
that representational modes of consciousness may not be able to
aﬀord. And as I began to discuss at the end of the last section,
reconnecting with this ‘primary articulation’ as artist-educators
may also help us to critically express and examine cultural-
political constructions and loosen sedimented ways of thinking
beginning at the most primordial levels of sense-making.
For students in an otherwise language and image driven soci-
ety exploring such possibilities is, of course, extremely valuable.
Indeed, because of its deep bio-cultural relevance music has
the potential to help us reengage with what Huxley refers to
as “ﬁrst order psychophysical experience” (Huxley, 1965, p. 37).
As Bowman (2004) points out, it is precisely music’s ability to
make us more aware of the “co-origination of body, mind and
culture” that makes is so valuable in education. Unfortunately,
the ‘non-verbal humanities’ that are essential for a truly com-
prehensive liberal education are often not given the attention
they deserve in the modern technology driven society (Huxley,
1965). Early childhood music education in the West does tend
to encourage such embodied exploration through sound making,
improvisation, empathic social enactments, and by maintaining
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the deep connection between music, dance, song, and story-
telling. However, when music student’s move on to formal music
education at secondary and post secondary levels they often risk
losing this primordial connection to why and how they became
involved withmusic in the ﬁrst place. The focus shifts to ‘training,’
conformity, authenticity, competition and performing ‘correctly.’
In this way they become ‘conditioned’ by the Western academic
model of music making that, as I have discussed, tends to see
music as a ‘work’ to be (re)produced or achieved through techni-
cal means (Elliott and Silverman, 2014). Far less attention, if any,
is given to creativity, embodiment, unique shared and individual
experiences, and to understanding what music means for self and
society15.
However, as Lines (2005) reminds us, “humans, asmusic expe-
riencing beings, have the capacity to re-interpret and follow lines
of de-territorialisation if they so wish, and in doing so create new
musical (and cultural) opportunities of value” (see also Deleuze
and Guattari, 1980). This echoes Krishnamurti’s (1970) appeal
for humanity to break away from ‘social conditioning’ and the
present day pedagogical perspective “aimed at making you con-
form, ﬁt into and adjust yourself to this acquisitive society [. . .]
You are educated to ﬁt into society: but that is not education, it
is merely a process which conditions you to conform [. . .].” As
critically ontological educators, it is our job to understand and
share how such conditioning occurs that prescribes the possibili-
ties of being and becoming teachers, musicians and human beings
so that we may develop new open-ended pedagogical possibili-
ties. This requires the development of a pedagogical perspective
that is non-conformist–one that is much more open and emo-
tionally, empathically, and critically aware; and that takes the
unique communal experiences of students and teachers seriously
as the foundation for fostering an ethical and compassionate
world (Jardine, 2012).
With this in mind, Eastern philosophy may have a great deal
to oﬀer when it aﬀords practical ways of ‘reawakening’ to richer,
animate ontological possibilities (Bai, 2013) than those imposed
from the perspective of ‘naive realism’ or what phenomenologists
often term the ‘natural attitude’–i.e., the non-critical acceptance
of the taken-for-granted ways we come to perceive the world,
which lead to sedimented, reiﬁed or highly conditioned ways of
knowing and being (Husserl, 1960, 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 2002).
Like the pedagogical move initiated by Socrates in Plato’sRepublic
(Heidegger, 1998; Thomson, 2001), opening up to the deeper
meaning of music through the ‘eastern perspective’ involves a
radical ‘turning around’ to face deeper dimensions of reality than
the one received by symbolic constructs. As I have discussed, the
linguistic-symbolic reality associated with the ‘secondary artic-
ulation’ is, of course, an important practical aspect of how we
organize our senses in day to day life (Di Paolo et al., 2010;
Stewart, 2010). However, as I have also attempted to demon-
strate, the belief that this mode of knowing is somehow separate
15Lines (2005) writes, “The problem with technically driven conceptions of music
is that they fail to adequately attend to the changing and transient character of
music events. Rather, the technicism of teaching methods that reinforce reductive
conceptions of music obscures music’s relationship to humankind and the qualities
of musical experiences that engage the character of that relationship.”
from our embodiment, or is itself wholly constitutive of mean-
ing, is illusory and leads to an impoverished ontology. Without
an awareness of more primordial dimensions of existence wemay
be led to believe that linguistic constructs are something more
than signiﬁers and descriptions of temporary relations between
transient categories and things; we may fail to see that they are
fundamentally relational and emergent themselves and thus fall
into the trap of making false ontological commitments–for exam-
ple, that “we are living in an objective world of concrete things
independent of us” (Nakagawa, 2000, p. 23)16.
Fortunately, music, enactivism and the Eastern perspective
can help us open up to a deeper cosmic reality that goes
beyond semantic articulation and sedimented ways of think-
ing and knowing. They may reconnect us with the dimensions
of the body, feeling and nature–where ‘mind’ emerges as part
of fundamental self-organizing life processes (Thompson, 2007;
Colombetti, 2014). From this holistic perspective we may begin
to understand the “realm of spatio-temporal interconnection in
which everything is dynamically and organically interconnected”
(Nakagawa, 2000, p. 32). Where nature, life, embodied mind and
the universe are,
[. . .] organic wholes, inseparably connected, and form a cosmic
world. The interconnections between things on this level are nei-
ther linear causal relations between objective beings nor the ﬁxed
codes of meaning of the social world but relationships that are per-
ceived in synchronicmutual causality and interdependence. [T]he
cosmic world is not structured in a static manner but in a ﬂuid
process of constant metamorphosis. In this sense, it is the world
of Becoming, which includes both relative being and non-relative
being taking place in the ﬂux of self-organizing, self-renewing
processes of the universe. Ceaseless processes of birth, growth,
decay, and death–the cycle of being and non-being–are the essen-
tial aspect of Becoming (the evolutionary process of the universe).
(Nakagawa, 2000, p. 32)
Here the grasping for a solid ground in some pre-given real-
ity of ﬁxed things and a stable uniﬁed self is exchanged for a
‘groundless’17 (sunyata) universe, where the ever-changing, rela-
tional, and interpenetrative experience of being and becoming is
embraced as an ‘emergent’ or ‘rising and falling’ phenomenon
(Varela et al., 1993). This concept of groundlessness or ‘no-self ’
leads to the heart of the Eastern conception of inﬁnite reality–the
fundamental non-being, non-diﬀerentiation, or ‘no-thing-ness,’
from which ‘being’ itself continually emerges and returns to18.
16This resonates with James’ famous dictum: “[. . .] nothing real is absolutely sim-
ple, that every smallest bit of experience is amultum in parvo plurally related, that
each relation is one aspect, character, or function, way of its being taken, or way of
its taking something else [. . .]” (James, 1996).
17It is interesting to note here that the ancient recognition of the inability to
ﬁnd stable, objective, or pre-given epistemological foundations, either ‘internally’
or ‘externally,’ associated with the Buddhist conception of sunyata actually pre-
ﬁgures much so-called continental philosophy–where ‘groundlessness’ is often
assumed to be a distinctly post-modern issue associated with scientiﬁc and cultural
developments in the 20th century (Rorty, 1979; Putnam, 1987; see Varela et al.,
1993).
18A number Eastern thinkers have discussed how the void tends toward self-
organization–i.e., how the universe itself possesses a primordial autopoietic ten-
dency (Nakagawa, 2000). Interestingly, such processes have been explored with
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Indeed, a growing awareness of the phenomenon of ‘being’
(thing-ness; identity; thought; the diﬀerentiated) as continually
emerging from and returning to ‘non-being’ (the born from the
unborn; diﬀerentiation to non-diﬀerentiation; thought into no-
thought; life into death) can help us understand that the kind
of information, knowledge, understandings and perceptions we
develop in real life interactions cannot be properly understood
in a strictly functionalist framework because they are not in fact
rooted in some kind of substantialist reality19. Rather, as we saw
with the enactive approach to bio-cognitive development, they
may be better understood as emergent properties of complex
relational dynamic systems (Varela et al., 1993)–where ‘entities’
and meanings may be understood as ‘knots’ of various relations,
which includes the perspective of the experiencing ‘subject’ her-
self as constituted by a unique and ongoing history of such rela-
tional processes (i.e., the asymmetrical and adaptive co-arising
organism-environment relationship I discussed at the begin-
ning). This view decentres the traditional Western preoccupation
with categorical ﬁxed (intrinsic or innate) notions of, among
other things, identity, drives, emotions, motivations, and intellec-
tual physical and creative abilities (Nakagawa, 2000; Colombetti,
2014). From this perspective such aspects are understood not
simply in terms of “something-or-other inside a person” (e.g.,
pre-given cognitive mechanisms; biological ‘programming’) but
rather in the shifting relational context of what happens between
people and things (Bateson, 1979/1980).
In much of Eastern thinking developing this relational per-
spective involves a progressive awakening to a multidimensional
ontology (see Nakagawa, 2000) that includes:
• the objective world (the experience of independently existing
things)
• the social world (conventions and symbols)
• the cosmic universe (the interconnectedness of all things)
• the inﬁnite universe (the primordial groundlessness; no-thing-
ness)
• the ultimate reality (the interpenetration and dependent co-
arising of all dimensions)
Here the taken-for-granted conditioning associated with the
world of ﬁxed objects and socio-cultural symbols and constructs
comes to be understood as such through a growing awareness of
the deep interconnectedness, co-dependence and impermanence
of all things and experiences.
To be clear, this is not to say that as one begins to gain
an awareness of the cosmic and inﬁnite dimensions of reality
the objective and cultural worlds are negated. Rather, like the
philosopher returning to the cave, one learns to reengage with
computer modeling where virtual structures self-organize from milieu whose ini-
tial state is random and non-diﬀerentiated (see Varela et al., 1993; Thompson,
2007).
19This is echoed from the enactive perspective by Froese (2012): “[. . .] the living
body is the ultimate source of signiﬁcance, but it can only serve this role because it
is a continually actively constructed body that is always precarious and vulnerable
to disintegration. The core meaning that derives from the ever-present potential of
death, an eventuality which can be negatively deﬁned as the cessation of all func-
tioning, cannot adequately be captured in functionalist terms” (see Di Paolo et al.,
2010).
them with a new understanding of what they really are. Thus an
awareness of ultimate reality involves awakening to the fact that
the experience of all ‘independent’ things–culture, nature, music,
social relations, emotions, feelings, identity and self, mind and
world–are relational and transforming; they ‘rise and fall’ through
interpenetrative relations. Experience of the world is thus an
enactive or dependently co-arising phenomenon20 (Macy, 1991;
Varela et al., 1993; Nakagawa, 2000).
In brief, the Eastern perspective oﬀers a framework whereby
one may begin to engage in new ways of experiencing and
understanding from a deeper, interpenetrative and transforming
multidimensional ontological perspective. In an educational con-
text this opens up critical and hermeneutic possibilities, where
the interactive and autopoietic nature of being and becom-
ing comes to the fore (Kincheloe, 2003; Jardine, 2012; Seidel
and Jardine, 2014), and where students and teachers may move
beyond externally dictated and sedimented ways of understand-
ing and engage more authentically, reﬂectively, and compas-
sionately with the world and themselves. Here presuppositions
may begin to be questioned, conditioning may be better under-
stood, and teachers and students may get down to the business
of exploring musical development in a way that embraces the
organic processes of life and the primary embodied-ecological
articulation of human consciousness–which reﬂects their funda-
mental status as living, autonomous participatory sense-makers
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). From this perspective music
education becomes a communal (Krishnamurti, 1970) pro-
cess that reﬂects the multi-modal and bio-cultural nature of
music-as-action–where subject–object dualities and mechanistic
metaphors recede; where transformative, embodied, non-verbal
and aﬀective-esthetic ways of knowing come to the fore; and
where the unique and transforming relationships between stu-
dents, teachers and the musical phenomena being explored may
be experienced in context of a dynamic, living pedagogical ecol-
ogy.
Exploring the Buddhist Psychology of ‘Self’
for Music Education
The enactive approach to cognition resonates deeply with
the Buddhist mindful-awareness tradition when it claims that
although phenomenal distinctions can be made between the
objects of experience, nothing, including the ‘self ’ or the ‘mind,’
exists as an independent entity–all experience, things, thoughts
and ideas arise and evolve co-dependently (Murti, 1955; Hopkins,
1983; Gyamtso, 1986; Kalupahana, 1987). Interestingly, the jux-
taposition of mindful-awareness with the enactive approach to
cognition also echoes important contemporary scientiﬁc con-
cerns regarding the notion of ‘self ’–where the mind is understood
as an essentially pluralistic phenomenon (Varela et al., 1993). The
work of Minsky (1986) and Jackendoﬀ (1987) in cognitive science
are particularly notable here as they are both willing to follow
this insight to the threshold of experience to discover, as Hume
(1964) and others have before them, that the notion of a ﬁxed
20Dependent co-arising is often understood in a complex three dimensional frame-
work that begins to be explored in the thought of Nagarjuna and that is further
developed in the ontology of Hua-Yen Buddhism (see Suzuki, 1970; Chang, 1971;
Garﬁeld, 1995; Tachikawa, 1997; Nakagawa, 2000).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 March 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 345
van der Schyff Music as a manifestation of life
and uniﬁed cognizing subject appears to be a phantom (see Varela
et al., 1993). Jackendoﬀ (1987) draws out the multi-modal nature
of cognition and the non-uniﬁed nature of the cognizing subject.
And likewise, Minsky (1986, 39–40) suggests that the self should
not be understood as a “centralized and all-powerful entity, but as
a society of ideas that include both the images of what the mind
is and our ideals of what it ought to be.”
Indeed, this comes close to “the Buddhist distinction between
the coherent pattern of dependently originated habits that we rec-
ognize as a person and the ego-self that a person may believe
she has and constantly grasps after but which does not actu-
ally exist” (Varela et al., 1993, p. 124). However, while the
mindful-awareness tradition makes the distinction between the
representation or concept of a ﬁxed ego-self and the habit-
ual ways of thinking that lead us to grasp for it (Gyamtso,
1986), no such distinction is clearly articulated in cognitive
science. That is, traditional cognitive science discovers the dis-
unity of the mind-self in the hypothezised sub-personal mech-
anisms (e.g., adapted modules) associated with the cognitivist
information-processing approach; but because it possesses no
disciplined method for examining experience it can go no fur-
ther than this21. By contrast, the mindful-awareness tradition
begins not with hypotheses, but with a rigorous examination of
lived experience. It thus oﬀers a systematic way of developing
consciousness that begins with sensation, movement, feeling, as
well as the needs, desires and cravings that motivate cognition as
action.
From this perspective experience is attended to in the con-
text of an interpenetrative aggregate consciousness (or ‘self,’ see
below) that may be further speciﬁed according to how experi-
ence is sourced in the senses (which are themselves understood
as ‘minds’; see Varela et al., 1993). Thus the mindful-awareness
practitioner is interested in examining the movements of the
‘aggregate mind’ from the ﬁrst person perspective–not in order to
grasp some ﬁxed notion of it, but rather to become increasingly
aware of consciousness as an ongoing emergent and transforming
process. This involves moving awareness beyond its habitual state
toward the possibilities that emerge when more fundamental,
embodied-aﬀective, ‘metaphorical,’ and interpenetrative aspects
of consciousness and cognition are recognized and developed (a
possibility not entertained by the traditional cognitivist who rel-
egates all basic cognitive processes to the sub-personal level). As
I discussed above, this allows us to embrace plurality and diﬀer-
ence in terms of a continually transforming multi-dimensional,
organic, cosmic whole.
With this in mind, Buddhist psychological concepts associ-
ated with the aggregate mind (no ﬁxed or uniﬁed self) may
hold great potential in for music education–especially in instru-
mental instruction and ensemble practice. As Nakagawa (2000)
points out, these concepts are not meant to be taken as religious
21As Varela et al. (1993, p. 54) write, “Jackendoﬀ assumes that everyday–largely
mindless–experience provides access to all relevant phenomenological evidence
and that the phenomenological quest is limited to just that largely mindless state.
He considers neither the possibility that conscious awareness can be progressively
developed beyond its everyday form (a strange omission given his interest in musi-
cal cognition) nor that such development can be used to provide direct insight into
the structure and constitution of experience.”
dogma (see also Garﬁeld, 1995), rather they are simply oﬀered
as psychological (and therapeutic) frameworks, which may be
developed in various contexts in order to better understand
embodied experience; the manifold aspects and transforming
nature of the ‘self ’; our relationships with people and things in
the world; and how certain ways of thinking and doing may
lead toward suﬀering in ourselves an others. In this way, they
provide highly pragmatic ways of understanding the psychology
of personal musical engagement in a multi-dimensional context
from moment to moment, day to day, and over the course of a
lifetime.
For example, when I am working with students I notice that
they often struggle with some notion of what they think the
music should be and how it should be realized. Sometimes this
notion can be very vague, which results in feelings of inadequacy
and confusion (a grasping for stable ground in some exter-
nal authority). Other students arrive with a highly conditioned
point of view that resists and restricts other possibilities–which
may lead to arrogance or closed mindedness (clinging to sedi-
mented conceptions of self, music and the world). Either way,
there is nothing enjoyable, revealing or transformative about
such closed and prescriptive orientations. Indeed, by focussing
on conforming to some ﬁxed outcome, musical identities and
meanings become deﬁned by external norms. This results in
reducing student–teacher (and student–student) communication
to mechanical technical issues and plays down transformative
communal possibilities–the enactive, self-world making poten-
tials of musicking are pushed aside in order to render the music
(and musician) as a product that must conform to some kind of
externally driven standard22.
In order to help understand and move beyond such condi-
tioning, I often ask students to attend to and discuss musical
experiences according to the interacting categories associated
with the “ﬁve aggregates” (see Varela et al., 1993). With prac-
tice students can learn to attend closely to these dynamic aspects
of self and become more aware of how the relationship between
them changes and develops.
(1) Forms (rupa) – the physicality (primordial embodiment) of
the body-instrument-world relationship.
(2) Feeling and Emotion (vedana) – the transforming aﬀective
contours of musical action and meaning.
(3) Perception, impulses and cognition (sanna) – the pri-
mary discernment and ‘directedness’ of musical relationships
(intentionality).
(4) The will and volition (sankhara) – the dispositional forma-
tions (habits) and desires that motivate musicking.
(5) Consciousness of all aggregates (vinnana) –musical discrim-
ination as continuous across the aggregates; the sense of a
binding relationship.
22This is not to imply that musical traditions and conventions are to be ignored
or rejected. To the contrary such an approach seeks to vitalize traditions by
encouraging students and teachers to engage critically and creatively with them
as autonomous world-makers–rather than passively allowing them to externally
impose ﬁxed ways and meanings.
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This may be developed further through an exploration of
the Buddhist framework through which all co-dependent aris-
ing occurs (in a musical context see Lowe, 2011). This is often
simpliﬁed to include twelve main states of being or nidanas (see
Nakagawa, 2000).
(1) ignorance (avidya)
(2) volitional (karmic) formation (samskara; the fourth aggre-
gate)
(3) consciousness (vijnana; the ﬁfth aggregate)
(4) name and form (nama-rupa)
(5) the six senses (sadayatana)
(6) impression-contact (sparsa)
(7) feeling (vedana; the second aggregate)
(8) craving (trsna)
(9) grasping (upadana)
(10) becoming (bhava)
(11) birth (jati)
(12) aging, dying, grief, suﬀering (jaramarana)
These descriptive-reﬂective frameworks resonate in many
ways with the autopoietic and pluralistic/co-arising perspective
on “mind in life” (Thompson, 2007) I discussed at the outset.
However, they need not be seen as necessarily referring to a ‘life-
span’ in the literal sense. Indeed, theymay also be understood in a
‘circular’ fashion in order to examine the emergent or ‘rising and
falling’ nature of contextual experience frommoment tomoment;
to explore the conditioning that leads to certain desires, craving
and grasping; and thus develop conscious awareness beyond its
taken-for-granted state.
When practicing a diﬃcult passage of music, a challenging
instrumental technique, or a new concept, these frameworks
may help students better understand and discuss the learning
process from the perspective of direct embodied experience; to
explore how their consciousness–their ‘self ’–is really a trans-
forming multi-dimensional phenomenon. Learning new musical
activities exercises the aspects of the self, which are required
to reach out to and engage with the world and each other in
new ways. Initially the results are never harmonious and may
involve a kind of discomfort (Sudnow, 1978). In such situations
the aggregates seem somewhat alienated from each other and
a frustrated desire and grasping may dominate–an uncomfort-
able perceptual closing in on the self and away from the world
where the emotional andmotivational aspects of the self may ﬁnd
themselves in crisis. Here a caring (encouraging, compassionate;
Noddings, 2012) teacher who has herself worked through sim-
ilar experiences may be of great help. She may encourage the
student to open up to their experience and attend to this pro-
cess carefully and honestly. This may help the student become
more aware of how musical knowledge develops in the context of
her unique bio-cognitive economy; and how certain sedimented
assumptions–bodily and cultural conditioning–may be prevent-
ing her from engaging fully with the possibilities aﬀorded by the
situation. The student may then begin to recognize how new
levels of musical being may be developed as the aggregates are
reintroduced to each other in a newways–and thus begin to let go
of the taken-for-granted notions of self, music and meaning and
open up to a relational way of musicking that values imagination,
creativity and personal transformation.
Such a process reinforces the dynamic and interpenetrative
(autonomous, dynamically open; see above) relationship between
student and teacher. The teacher is attentive to and cares for
the unique needs of the student; she shares her knowledge
through example and supports the student’s reaching out to
becoming-musical by fostering an environment that aﬀords the
discovery of new dynamic relationships and patterns (Granott
and Parziale, 2002; Noddings, 2012). As they go, student and
teacher may then explore things together from more nuanced
emotional, bodily and conceptual points of view. What is dis-
covered here is that there may be many ways to approach and
understand the given piece, passage, technique, concept, or musi-
cal cultural meaning–a perspective that suﬃces or is viable in
one context (or on one day) may not work well in another.
Students thus learn to let go of ﬁxed understandings and attend
to the moment; they are encouraged to reach out for diﬀer-
ence, transformation and they learn to avoid relying on facile
or simplistic recognitions of musical relationships that emerge
from conditioned, reductive or reiﬁed understandings (Dewey,
2005).
Along these lines, Biswas (2012) discusses how improvisation
and the bodily exploration of repetitive musical activities (e.g.,
rhythmic drumming) may be combined with mindful awareness
techniques (in his case vipassana meditation) in order expand
musical awareness. Here practitioners are asked to attend to
their entire bodies (breathing, extremities, parts of the body
not explicitly involved in the action) as they engage in musi-
cal activities, and thus better understand the bodily condition-
ing (tensions, grasping, ways of doing and feeling) that may
be preventing them from developing new understandings and
potentials23. Such activities may be combined with other forms of
exploration such as Alexander technique, phenomenological and
multi-modal analysis (e.g., metaphorical description); and they
may also be explored collectively in ensembles where students
may be encouraged to extend their listening and action out into
the world–to reach out empathically and compassionately and
thus participate more deeply in the communal-interpenetrative
mind and world-making process that music aﬀords. Here too,
conditioning and dependent co-arising may explored at the
macro level and thus musicking, as Biswas (2012) suggests, may
be understood as a form of “public meditation” (see also Sarath,
2006).
Developing these basic psychological frameworks through
musical practice may also extend well beyond the practice room
and into the life-world of the student. That is they may help stu-
dents better understand what it means to be a dynamic, creative,
autopoietic creature–as well as the suﬀering and psycho-spirtual
or creative ‘death’ (i.e., dynamic closure) associated with grasp-
ing for unchecked desires and predetermined outcomes (fame,
money, entitlement), and ﬁxed or detached conceptions of self
23As a drum teacher, I often work with students in this way with repeating
polyrhythms, where students are asked to attend to and describe the transforming
experience of listening and playing from a range of embodied-esthetic perspectives.
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and world. Developing such awareness may help them avoid
the pitfalls of pride, competitiveness and bitterness as they go
on to experience both the successes and the inevitable per-
sonal frustrations and disappointments they will face throughout
their career. This may also help them better understand how
such grasping may aﬀect their performance and enjoyment of
music in the moment as they learn to let go and attend more
deeply to what they are doing and feeling–to keep the music and
themselves dynamically open, compassionate and thus, creatively
‘alive.’
Conclusion
From the Eastern-enactive perspective, music is not retrieved
from a pre-given world ‘out there’ but rather emerges from our
embodied consciousness as it reaches out to, transforms, and is
transformed by the ongoing process of empathic inter(en)action
with objects, ideas and other minds. By this view, the chal-
lenge of becoming a skilled (and compassionate) musician and
music educator is not due to the fact that the music is ‘hard’
but rather because it is ‘open,’ equivocal and transformative
(Bowman, 2004). And indeed, we might also note here how the
act of listening arguably oﬀers a more explicitly transformative
and interpenetrative perspective on the world than the visual
dimension usually aﬀords. Through vision the diﬀerentiation
(separation) or ﬁxity of things, objects or events is more easily
taken for granted. The auditory world, by contrast, is less obvi-
ously diﬀerentiated and more explicitly interpenetrative, aﬀective
and emergent–where events continuously rise and fall from a
background of ‘silence’ or non-diﬀerentiation in ways that are
co-dependent with our unique ways of reaching out through
listening (Ihde, 2007). With this in mind, students and teach-
ers may be encouraged take their active listening ‘out’ into the
urban and natural worlds–creatively and reﬂectively–in order to
better understand the origins of music as an active ecological phe-
nomenon and thus develop a deeper awareness of the primordial,
empathic, and interpenetrative experience of being-in-the-world.
Mathews (2008, p. 53) develops this pedagogical possibility when
she points out how empathic and ‘synergistic’ activities such as
musicking may open us up to a deeper compassionate relation-
ship with all life and thus help “induce in humans a moral point
of view with respect to other-than-human life forms” (see also
Nollman, 1990, 1999, 2000; Wallin et al., 2000; Rothenberg, 2005,
2014; Rothenberg and Ulvaeus, 2009). Here students and teach-
ers may be “encouraged to identify imaginatively with wider and
wider circles of the [sonic] landscape, until, hopefully, the stu-
dents acquire an expanded sense of identity, described in deep
ecology literature as the ‘ecological self ”’ (Mathews, 2008, p. 54;
see Naess, 1985, 1995). In this way our musicality may reawaken
us to the deep continuity between natural and human worlds–a
continuity that, as I have argued all along, is beautifully spanned
by the bio-cultural nature of music itself.
There is, of course, much more to say about the relevance of
enactivism and the Eastern perspective for being and becoming
a musician and music educator. However, I hope I have oﬀered
the reader a useful introduction and provided some possibilities
for how music and music education may be better understood
a ‘manifestation of life.’ As I have attempted to show, this per-
spective sees music education as a deeply contemplative activity
that begins with an exploration of the primordial meaning of
musicality as an open intersubjective form of empathic partici-
patory sense-making–one that originates deep in our biological
selves. I hope, then, that the ideas and concepts I have oﬀered here
may help music educators become more aware of the autopoietic
and world-making potentials of music; move beyond nature–
culture dichotomies as well as nihilistic and purely technically
driven approaches; and thus reengage with music and music edu-
cation as a powerful way of reconnecting human life with the
fundamental life.
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